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Abstract. Galor discovered many mysteries of the growth process. He lists them in his 
Unified Growth Theory and wonders how they can be explained. Close inspection of his 
mysteries reveals that they are of his own creation. They do not exist. He created them by 
his habitually distorted presentation of data. One of his self-created mysteries is the mystery 
of the alleged sudden spurt in the growth rate of income per capita. This sudden spurt never 
happened. In order to understand the growth rate of income per capita, its mathematical 
properties are now explored and explained. The explanation is illustrated using the 
historical world economic growth. Galor also wonders about the sudden spurt in the growth 
rate of population. We show that this sudden spurt was also created by the distorted 
presentation of data. The mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the growth 
of human population is yet to be explained but it would be unproductive to try to explain 
the non-existing and self-created mysteries of the growth process described in the 
scientifically unacceptable Unified Growth Theory. However, the problem is much deeper 
than just the examination of this theory. Demographic Growth Theory is based on the 
incorrect but deeply entrenched postulates developed by accretion over many years and 
now generally accepted in the economic and demographic research, postulates revolving 
around the concept of Malthusian stagnation and around a transition from stagnation to 
growth. The study presented here and earlier similar publications show that these postulates 
need to be replaced by interpretations based on the mathematical analysis of data and on the 
correct understanding of hyperbolic distributions. 
 
Introduction 
In the subsection entitled “Mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) 
presented in his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011), Galor asks a series 
of questions about the mysteries of economic growth. We can take his questions 
one by one and show that all these mysteries were of his own creation.  
His theory is not based on the scientific analysis of data but on impressions 
supported by the habitually distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 
2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; 
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Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Such approach to research can 
easily create many mysteries that simply do not exist.  
One of Galor’s questions about the alleged mysteries of growth process is “What is 
the origin of the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita and population 
that occurred in the course of the take-off from stagnation to growth?“ (Galor, 
2005a, p. 220). In just one sentence, Galor presents two incorrect doctrines: the 
doctrine of the presence of the sudden spurt and the doctrine of the transition from 
stagnation to growth, both created by the failure to follow scientific principles of 
investigations, which require that data should not be manipulated to support 
preconceived ideas but that they should be methodically analysed with the aim of 
learning from them. We shall show that this question makes as much sense as the 
question, “Why is the Sun rotating around the Earth,” and the answer to both of 
them is similar: the Sun does not rotate around the Earth and there was no sudden 
spurt in the growth rates of output per capita and population. There was also no 
takeoff from stagnation to growth (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 
2016d, 2016e, 2016f)  
We have already demonstrated that the growth of human population and the growth 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), global and regional, were hyperbolic 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e). Hyperbolic growth is 
monotonic, and consequently it is also characterised by the monotonically-
increasing growth rate. There is no sudden spurt in this type of distributions.  
The output per capita (also described as income per capita and measured using the 
GDP/cap) is represented by the ratio of two, monotonically-increasing, hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2015). The growth rate of this ratio is monotonic.  It cannot 
contain “the sudden spurt” claimed erroneously by Galor.  
Galor’s questions about the mysteries of growth are strongly misleading because 
they describe features created by the distorted presentation of data. The created 
features and the associated questions divert attention from the correct 
understanding of the mechanism of economic growth. Galor’s theory does not 
explain the mechanism of economic growth but describes phantom features he 
created.  
We have already discussed (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 5016d, 
2016e) various aspects of Galor’s theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). We shall now focus 
our attention on the discussion of his unsubstantiated claims about the growth rates. 
We shall use precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used by Galor (2005a, 
2011), who unfortunately did not analyse them.  
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect but it is just an embodiment of 
the incorrect concepts used traditionally in the economic and demographic 
research, concepts developed by accretion over many years and now so strongly 
entrenched that it will be difficult to uproot them and replace them by correct 
interpretations. However, it is expected that it is in the interest of every economist 
and demographer to have scientific basis for their research.  
These erroneous interpretations revolve around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation and around a transition from stagnation to growth. The study presented 
here and in earlier publications (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 
2016e, 2016f) demonstrate that these traditional interpretations need to be replaced 
by interpretations based on the mathematical analysis of data and on the correct 
understanding of hyperbolic distributions.  
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The latest data of Maddison (2001, 2010) serve as a rich source of information. 
When mathematically analysed, conclusions based on these data are in perfect 
agreement with earlier research (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; 
Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Kremer, 1993; Kapitza, 
2006; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Podlazov, 2002, Shklovskii, 
1962, 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; von 
Foerster, Mora and Amiot , 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). Their combined message is 
that the demographic and economic growth research has to be based on accepting 
the unambiguous and consistent evidence in data that the historical growth of 
human population and of economic growth were hyperbolic and that such a growth 
cannot be divided into two or three different regimes of growth governed by 
distinctly different mechanisms of growth. Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long 
time and fast over a short time but it is still the same growth governed by the same 
mechanism of growth. Hyperbolic distributions have to be interpreted as a whole 
and not in parts. What appears as stagnation is hyperbolic growth and what appears 
as takeoff or explosion is the natural continuation of the same hyperbolic growth.   
 
Fundamental mathematics 
Growth rate ( )R S of a growing entity S can be defined as: 
1
( )
dS
R S
S dt
 ,              (1) 
where S can represent the GDP, the size of the population or any other growing 
entity. 
Let us assume that we have two growing entities 1S and 2S , and that we want to 
calculate the growth rate of the ratio of these two entities, i.e. the growth rate  
1 2( )R S S . It is easy to see that 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
( )1
( ) ( ) ( )
d S S
R S S R S R S
S S dt
.          (2) 
We have obtained an interesting and important equation. The growth rate of the 
ratio of two distributions is the difference between the growth rates of its two 
components. Thus, for instance, the growth rate of the GDP/cap is given by the 
difference between the growth rate of the GDP and the growth rate of population.  
If two growing entities increase monotonically (as it is in the case of the historical 
economic growth and of the historical growth of population) their growth rates also 
increase monotonically and consequently the growth rate of their ratio, which is 
represented by the difference between the monotonically-increasing growth rates of 
each of the two components, is also increasing monotonically. It does not contain a 
sudden spurt.  
Hyperbolic growth is described by the following simple differential equation: 
1 dS
kS
S dt
,             (3) 
where S can represent the GDP or the size of the population, or indeed any other 
hyperbolically-increasing entity, while k is a positive constant. 
If we compere this differential equation with the general definition of the growth 
rate given by the eqn (1) we can see that the characteristic feature of hyperbolic 
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growth is that its growth rate is directly proportional to the size of the growing 
entity: 
( )R S kS .               (4) 
The growth rate of hyperbolic distributions increases hyperbolically. The time 
dependence of the growth rate of hyperbolic distributions creates precisely the 
same illusions as the time dependence of hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2014). The 
growth rate of hyperbolic distribution is slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time but it is a monotonically-increasing distribution, which cannot be divided into 
mathematically-justifiable slow and fast components because the transition from 
slow to fast growth occurs all the time along the entire time-range of such a 
distribution. The growth rate of hyperbolic growth does not contain any sudden 
spurt at any time. 
The equation (3) can be solved easily by substitution 1S Z . Its solution is: 
1
( )
S
a kt
,               (5) 
where a is a constant, which can be determined empirically by comparing the 
calculated curve with data. 
So, now, if we use the eqn (2) and if we assume that 1S and 2S are hyperbolic, then 
1
1 1
1
( )
S
a k t
              (6) 
and 
2
2 2
1
( )
S
a k t
.              (7) 
Consequntly, by using the eqn (4) we have 
1
1
1 1
( )
k
R S
a k t
              (8) 
and  
2
2
2 2
( )
k
R S
a k t
.             (9) 
If we now use these expressions in the eqn (2) we shall get 
1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
( )
( )( )
k k
R S S
a k t a k t a k t a k t
,          (10) 
where 
1 2 2 1k a k a .            (11) 
The eqn (10) can be also presented as 
1 2 2
0 1 2
1
( / )R S S
A A t A t
,          (12) 
where 
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1 2
0
a a
A ,             (13) 
1 2 2 1
1
k a k a
A ,            (14) 
1 2
2
k k
A .             (15) 
So, while the growth rate of hyperbolic distributions is described by the reciprocal 
of a linear function [see the eqns (8) and (9)] the growth rate of the ratio of 
hyperbolic distributions is described by the reciprocal of the second-order 
polynomial [see the eqn (12)]. We could call it the second-order hyperbolic 
distribution. It is a distribution, which resembles closely the first-order hyperbolic 
distribution (the reciprocal of the linear function) because it also increases slowly 
over a long time and escapes to infinity at a fixed time. However, it is a 
monotonically-increasing distribution.  
It obviously makes no sense to claim a sudden spurt in the monotonically changing 
second-order polynomial and it obviously makes no sense to claim a sudden spurt 
in the reciprocal of the second-order polynomial. The sudden spurt can be created 
by distorting data, as Galor did, but then it is no longer science. Whether 
deliberately created or not, such distorted presentation of evidence is generally 
unacceptable even outside science. However, suitable distortion of evidence is 
sometimes used in defending doctrines accepted by faith. The distorted 
presentation of empirical evidence makes the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) scientifically unacceptable.  
Another way to understand that the growth rate of the ratio of two hyperbolic 
distributions (e.g. the growth rate of the GDP/cap distribution) cannot contain a 
sudden spurt is by looking at the denominator of the eqn (10), which is given by a 
product of two linearly decreasing functions. Multiplication of two linear 
distributions produces a monotonic distribution, which does not contain a sudden 
spurt.    
Had Galor analysed the data (Maddison, 2001) he would have perhaps found that 
the GDP and the size of the population were increasing hyperbolically. Maybe, 
then, it would have been clear to him that monotonic distributions cannot be 
characterised by the non-monotonic sudden spurt. Such an analysis should have 
been prompted by the discovery made over 50 years ago that the growth of human 
population during the AD era was hyperbolic (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). 
This vital discovery, published in the prestigious journal of Science, is not even 
mentioned in Galor’s theory, maybe because it was an inconvenient discovery.   
As in the case of hyperbolic distributions which can be studied easily by 
investigating the reciprocal values of the size of the growing entity,  1 / S  (Nielsen, 
2014), an easy way to study the growth rate of the ratio of hyperbolic distributions 
is by using the reciprocal values of the growth rate, 1 21/ ( )R S S  . As 1 / S  converts 
the confusing hyperbolic distribution to a linear function, which is then easy to 
understand, so also the reciprocal values, 1 21/ ( )R S S , convert the second-order 
hyperbolic distribution into an easy-to-interpret second-order polynomial. In both 
cases, the confusing features, which create the illusion of a slow growth over a long 
time followed by a sudden spurt disappear and are replaced by much simpler 
distributions.  
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Confusing features of hyperbolic distributions can be also clarified by using 
semilogarithmic displays. Such displays are routinely used for distributions, which 
vary over a large range of values. We shall use them in our present discussion.  
 
World economic growth 
 
Growth of the GDP, population and income per capita (GDP/cap) 
 
According to Galor, historical economic growth is characterised by takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth, which occurred around AD 1750 for developed regions and 
around AD 1900 for less-developed regions (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). He describes 
them as “stunning” or “remarkable” escapes from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220). Such remarkable escapes should be readily identifiable in 
data describing economic growth and of the growth of human population. In 
particular, for the data describing the world economic growth and the growth of 
population, we should see clearly two takeoffs, around AD 1750 and around AD 
1900.  
The alleged takeoff from the assumed stagnation to growth for developed countries 
coincides with the onset of the Industrial Revolution, AD 1760-1840 (Floud & 
McCloskey, 1994), which according to Galor was “the prime engine of economic 
growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). It is, therefore, yet another reason why the takeoff 
for the developed countries and the associated “sudden spurt” in the growth rates 
should be easy to identify because the alleged prime engine should have been 
working most effectively in these countries. 
Results of analysis of precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used, but never 
analysed, by Galor during the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011), are presented in Figures 1-3. 
 
Figure 1. Data for the Gross Domestic Product (Maddison, 2001), precisely the 
same data as used but never analysed by Galor during the formulation of the 
Unified Growth Theory (2005a, 2011), are compared with the first-order 
hyperbolic distribution [eqn (5)]. The GDP is expressed in billions of 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. Parameters describing the fitted hyperbolic 
distribution are: 21.716 10a  and 68.671 10k  . 
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Figure 2. Data describing the growth of the world population during the AD 
era (Maddison, 2001) are compared with the hyperbolic distribution. The large 
discrepancy at AD 1 is because of the maximum in the growth of the world 
population around that year associated with the transition from a fast-increasing 
hyperbolic distribution during the BC era to a slower hyperbolic distribution 
during the AD era (Nielsen, 2016b). Parameters describing the fitted hyperbolic 
distribution are 
08.724 10a  and 34.267 10k  . 
 
 
Figure 3. Income per capita (GDP/cap). Data (Maddison, 2001) compared with 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2015) representing the 
ratio of hyperbolic distributions of the GDP and of the size of population. Income 
per capita was increasing monotonically. Such monotonic increase cannot produce 
a non-monotonic growth rate claimed by Galor (2005a, 2011). It cannot produce 
“the sudden spurt in the growth rates of output per capita” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
His “stunning” or “remarkable” takeoffs from stagnation to growth (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not happen. Industrial Revolution, the “prime engine of 
economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212) had no impact on changing the 
economic-growth trajectory. All these stories are contradicted by data (Maddison, 
2001), precisely the same data as used but not analysed during the formulation of 
the Unified Growth Theory. 
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Economic growth, as described by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shown in 
Figure 1, was hyperbolic. The alleged “prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 
2005a, p. 212) did nothing to change the growth trajectory. This is an interesting 
issue, which requires further investigation because technological discoveries were 
used to support economic growth but surprisingly perhaps they had absolutely no 
impact on changing the growth trajectory. It is as if economic growth was 
controlled by some other unknown and much stronger force, which was active 
before the Industrial Revolution and remained undisturbed during and after the 
Industrial Revolution. The alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth did not 
happen because there was no stagnation. Economic growth was hyperbolic before 
and after the alleged takeoffs. The takeoffs claimed by Galor simply did not exist. 
The growth of population during the AD era, shown in Figure 2, was also 
hyperbolic, at least from around AD 1000, in perfect agreement with the discovery 
made over 50 years ago by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960). The discrepancy 
at AD 1 is explained by the analysis of the growth of human population in the past 
12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016b), which revealed a maximum around that year 
associated with the transition from a fast-increasing hyperbolic growth during the 
BC era to a slower hyperbolic growth during the AD era. This extended analysis 
demonstrated that there was an uninterrupted hyperbolic growth between 10,000 
BC and around 500 BC, followed by a transition to a new hyperbolic growth 
commencing around AD 500. It also revealed a small disturbance of the hyperbolic 
growth between AD 1200 and 1400. The data show that during the past 12,000 
years there was no stagnation and no sudden takeoff at any time, both in the growth 
of the population and in the growth rate. 
It is remarkable that so many independent studies are in such perfect agreement: 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and their analysis (Nielsen, 2016a, 
2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f); the estimates of the size of human population not 
only during the AD era but also during the BC era (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; 
Cook,1960; Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 
1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; 
Trager, 1994) and their analysis (e.g. Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; Kapitza, 
2006); the discovery made by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960) and similar 
identifications of hyperbolic growth by Hoerner (1975), Podlazov (2002) and 
Shklovskii (1962, 2002).  
In contrast, Unified Growth Theory and the generally accepted but questionable 
postulates used in economic and demographic research describe events and 
processes occurring in the world characterised by Malthusian stagnation, takeoffs, 
sudden spurts and by the “remarkable” or “stunning” escapes from the Malthusian 
traps (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), the world which is entirely different than the 
world revealed by data and by their mathematical analysis.  
There appears to be no formal definition of Malthusian stagnation but this concept 
is totally irrelevant in the study of the mechanism of economic growth and of the 
growth of human population. They were hyperbolic. There was no stagnation and 
no transition from the imagined stagnation to growth. Using such descriptions to 
explain the mechanism of growth is unscientific because these postulates are 
consistently contradicted by data.   
Results of analysis of income per capita (GDP/cap) presented in Figure 3 also 
demonstrate a monotonically-increasing distribution at least from AD 1500, i.e. 
during the time when Galor’s “remarkable” and “stunning” effects should be 
clearly visible. What is remarkable about this distribution is that nothing 
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remarkable or stunning ever happened. The growth of the GDP/cap was 
remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate the growth of income 
per capita and there were no sudden takeoffs at any time.  
Such monotonically-increasing distributions, as presented in Figures 1-3, cannot be 
expected to generate “the sudden spurt” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) in the 
corresponding growth rates and we shall soon see that they did not. 
 
Growth rates of the GDP, population and income per capita (GDP/cap) 
 
Results of analysis of growth rates are shown in Figures 4-6. Empirical growth 
rates were calculated using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated 
gradients. The predicted growth rates were calculated using the fitted distributions 
shown in Figures 1-3. 
As expected, the growth rate of the world GDP was increasing monotonically. 
Industrial Revolution did not accelerate economic growth. The “remarkable” or 
“stunning” escapes from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), which 
were supposed to have been reflected in the takeoffs from stagnation to growth, 
never happened because there was no stagnation and the trap did not exist. The 
growth rate was increasing along a remarkably robust trajectory. 
Analysis of the growth rate of the world population shows also the remarkable 
contradiction of Galor’s claims by precisely the same data, which he used, but 
never analysed, during the formulation of his Unified Growth Theory. His wished-
for and claimed features never happened. The growth rate of human population 
was increasing monotonically. There was absolutely no sudden spurt at any time. 
 
 
Figure 4. Growth rate of the wold GDP was increasing monotonically. There was 
no sudden spurt. The claimed takeoffs did not happen. Industrial Revolution did not 
accelerate economic growth. 
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Figure 5. Growth rate of the world population. Empirical growth rate calculated 
using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated gradients is compared 
with the predicted growth rate calculated using parameters of the fitted hyperbolic 
distribution displayed in Figure 2. Galor’s claims (Galor, 2005a, 2011) are 
remarkably contradicted by the analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), 
precisely the same data, which he used but never properly analysed. Galor’s 
mystery of “the sudden spurt” in the growth rate of population (Galor, 2005a, p. 
220) is solved – there was no sudden spurt. 
 
 
Figure 6. Growth rate of income per capita (GDP/cap). Empirical growth rate 
calculated using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated gradients is 
compared with the predicted growth rate calculated using parameters of the fitted 
hyperbolic distributions displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Galor’s claims (Galor, 
2005a, 2011) are remarkably contradicted by the analysis of Maddison’s data 
(Maddison, 2001), precisely the same data, which he used but never properly 
analysed. Galor’s mystery of “the sudden spurt” in the growth rate of income per 
capita (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) is solved – there was no sudden spurt. 
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In order to support his preconceived ideas, Galor ignored not only the analysis 
carried out over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) but also 
research contributions of his many other predecessors (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; 
Cook,1960; Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Hoerner 
(1975); Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 
1975; Trager, 1994). Galor’s claims are in conflict with science. They are not just 
unsupported by science – they are repeatedly contradicted by the scientific analysis 
of data and most notably by the analysis of precisely the same data, which he used 
during the formulation of his theory. 
Mathematical analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), precisely the same 
data as used by Galor, solves also his mystery “of the sudden spurt in growth rates 
of output per capita” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) – there was no spurt. Results of 
analysis are presented in Figure 6. Growth rate of income per capita (GDP/cap) 
was increasing monotonically. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate the growth 
of income per capita. The postulated takeoffs from stagnation to growth (yet 
another mystery of growth claimed by Galor) did not happen because there was no 
stagnation and because the growth rate was increasing steadily without any major 
interruption. The only real mystery is why the growth rate of income per capita was 
so remarkably stable over such a long time.  
Hyperbolic distributions, which increase monotonically, are characterised by 
monotonically-increasing growth rates, as shown in Figures 5-6. Claiming the 
existence of sudden spurts in such distributions is scientifically unjustifiable. Going 
a step further and claiming that such an imaginary spurt is a mystery, which needs 
to be explained encourages other researchers to carry out pointless and 
unproductive research. 
It is useful to compare the mathematical analysis of Maddions’s data presented in 
Figure 6 with the distorted presentation used by Galor reproduced in Figure 7. Both 
figures are based on precisely the same set of data (Maddison, 2001). The contrast 
is striking.  
 
Figure 7. Galor’s distorted, strongly suggestive and misleading presentation of 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) describing the growth rate of output (income) 
per capita (Galor, 2005a, p. 179). Precisely the same data, when correctly 
displayed and analysed (see Figure 6),  show that ”the sudden spurt in the growth 
rate of output per capita” claimed by Galor (2005a, p. 220) did not exist. 
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While the data and their analysis, displayed in Figure 6, present monotonically-
increasing growth rate of income per capita, Galor’s distorted presentation of 
precisely the same data show a clear “sudden spurt.” Maybe Galor was so strongly 
guided by the traditional interpretations of economic growth that he could not 
accept the clear contradicting evidence or maybe he simply did not know how to 
analyse data. In any case, intentional or unintentional, such ubiquitous distorted 
diagrams used repeatedly in his theory can be hardly expected to lead to reliable 
conclusions. On the contrary, they can be expected to lead only to incorrect 
conclusions.  
Galor gives also many isolated examples of small growth rates in the past and 
significantly larger values at a later stage of growth but all these examples are not 
only meaningless but also strongly misleading. They reflect nothing more than just 
the natural properties of hyperbolic distributions. Using them to prove stagnation 
and transitions from stagnation to growth is scientifically irresponsible. 
Of course growth rates of income per capita (GDP/cap) were small over a long 
time and significantly larger at a certain later stage of growth because they were 
following monotonically-increasing second-order hyperbolic distributions [see eqn 
(12)]. Hyperbolic distributions (second-order or first-order) are slow over a long 
time and fast over a short time but they are still the same, monotonically-increasing 
distributions. They are not characterised by sudden spurts. There is no profound 
mystery about them that needs to be explained by some elaborate research or 
mathematical formulations. It is just a simple and straightforward hyperbolic 
growth. The mystery is solved.  Picking up some isolated numbers from such 
hyperbolic distributions and drawing some profound conclusions based on such 
examples is unscientific. The only mystery that needs to be explained is why the 
economic growth and the growth of population were hyperbolic and why they were 
so remarkably stable (undisturbed) over such a long time. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Galor discovered many “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). 
One of his mysteries is “the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita and 
population that occurred in the course of the take-off from stagnation to 
growth“(Galor, 2005a, p. 220).  
His discoveries are based on the crude and distorted presentations of data (Ashraf, 
2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). His mysteries are of his 
own creation.  They do not need to be explained because they do not exist. They 
describe the world of fiction.  
Historical economic growth and the growth of human population were hyperbolic 
(Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von 
Hoerner, 1975). Hyperbolic distributions are monotonic and they are characterised 
by the monotonically-increasing growth rates. Sudden spurts do not exist in such 
distributions. 
It is essential to understand that it is incorrect to take a slowly-increasing 
distribution and automatically claim the evidence of Malthusian stagnation. The 
state of stagnation might occur when there is a strong interference between a 
primary force propelling growth and some random opposing forces. Effects of 
stagnation should be reflected in the growth trajectory, which should be clearly 
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unstable. If the growth follows a steadily-increasing trajectory without any clear 
signs of random behaviour then there is no need to complicate the description of 
the mechanism of growth by introducing random forces whose presence is 
undetectable. The fundamental principle of scientific investigation is to look for the 
simplest descriptions and explanations. Introducing unnecessary complications is 
simply unscientific. 
It appears that the established knowledge in demography and in economic research 
is strongly based on a series of postulates revolving around the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation and around the alleged transition from the imagined 
stagnation to growth. Complicated mechanisms and interactions are then used (and 
gradually made even more complicated) to explain the mechanism of growth. 
Galor went one step further and reinforced these incorrect interpretations by his 
persistently distorted presentations of data (such as shown in Figure 7) and by his 
repeated quotations of certain well-selected figures to support his preconceived 
ideas, figures which were supposed to illustrate the concepts of stagnation and 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth but when closely analysed illustrate nothing 
else than the simple hyperbolic growth. All such complicated explanations are 
contradicted by data. Close examination of data shows that there was no stagnation 
and no transition from stagnation to growth. Data show consistently that the 
mechanism of the economic growth and of the growth of human population must 
have been simple because hyperbolic growth is exceptionally simple [see eqn (5)]. 
Some types of growth might be slow and stagnant but hyperbolic growth is not 
stagnant even when it is slow. It is prompted by the same mechanism during the 
time when it is slow and when it is fast. If the mechanism of Malthusian stagnation 
is used to explain the slow hyperbolic growth, precisely the same mechanism 
should be used to explain the fast growth, which is commonly described as 
explosion. It is incorrect to divide hyperbolic distributions into two or three 
sections and assign different mechanisms of growth to each of such arbitrarily 
selected sections. Hyperbolic distributions have to be explained as a whole and the 
same mechanism should be applied to the apparent slow and to the apparent fast 
sections.  
It is incorrect to take a hyperbolic distribution and look for a sudden takeoff from 
the imagined stagnation to growth, as Galor did repeatedly. It is impossible to 
divide hyperbolic distribution into such distinctly different sections and the best 
way to see it, is by using the reciprocal values (Nielsen, 2014) because hyperbolic 
distribution is then represented by a decreasing straight line and it is obvious that it 
is impossible to claim a change of direction on the straight, which shows no change 
of direction. 
Hyperbolic growth is not the only type of growth that can be slow over a certain 
time but not stagnant. Exponential growth is initially slow but it gradually becomes 
faster.  At a certain stage, as if suddenly, it becomes overwhelmingly fast, the 
effect described as “the second half of the chessboard” (Kurzweil, 1999). Logistic 
growth is also initially slow but it is not stagnant.  
The difference between hyperbolic and exponential distributions is that for 
hyperbolic distributions the apparent (but non-existent) transition from a slow to 
fast growth is more clearly articulated. That is why hyperbolic distributions are so 
often misinterpreted, particularly if they are distorted as it is done repeatedly and 
persistently in Galor’s publications. However, this apparent transition from slow to 
fast growth does not happen at any given time or even over a certain specific range 
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of time. It happens all the time. The acceleration is gradual along the entire range 
of hyperbolic distribution.  
Growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) is represented by the ratio of two 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015). The ratio of monotonically increasing- 
distributions is characterised by the monotonically-increasing growth rate. We have 
shown that while the growth rate of the GDP and population increases 
hyperbolically, the growth rate of income per capita (GDP/cap) increases by 
following a second-order hyperbolic distribution (the reciprocal of the second order 
polynomial). There is no sudden spurt in any of these distributions and we have 
demonstrated this point by using the world economic growth and the growth of 
human population.   
When doctrines accepted by faith are defended, scientific rules of engagement are 
readily violated. Contradicting data are then either ignored or manipulated to 
support preconceived ideas. Economic and demographic research has no place for 
this type of activities. However, intentionally or unintentionally, such unscientific 
approach to research appears to have been adopted during the formulation of the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Numerous preceding research works 
(e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand,1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 
1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & 
Jones, 1978; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; von Foerster, Mora and Amiot, 1960; von 
Hoerner, 1975) were ignored and the excellent data of Maddison (2001) were 
manipulated and distorted to support a series of preconceived ideas.  
Hyperbolic distributions may be confusing but there is no excuse for distorting 
them to make them even more confusing. There is also no excuse for failing to 
analyse hyperbolic distributions because their analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 
2014). The analysis of the growth rates is in the same category. Graphically, all 
these distributions become abundantly clear by using either the semilogarithmic 
scales of reference of by displaying the reciprocal values of growing entities or of 
their corresponding growth rates.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is scientifically unacceptable and so are also many 
traditional interpretations of economic growth and of the growth of human 
population, interpretations based on the incorrect understanding of the 
mathematical properties of hyperbolic distributions. The recent and readily-
accessible Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) make it now easy to study the 
mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the growth of human 
population. They demonstrate that certain fundamental postulates revolving around 
the concept of Malthusian stagnation and around the assumed transition from the 
non-existent stagnation to growth, still used routinely in the established knowledge 
in demography and in economic research, are no longer acceptable. 
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